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INTERNATIONAL LAW, RELIGIOUS LIMITATIONS, AND
CULTURAL SENSITIVITY: THE PARK51 MOSQUE AT
GROUND ZERO
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2010, a controversy erupted after news surfaced of a
planned mosque two blocks from New York City’s Ground Zero.1 The
proposed location of the mosque, now named Park51,2 inflamed the passions
of many Americans who believed that the Muslim institution would threaten
both the memories of September 11, 2001, and the respect for those killed by
the terrorist attacks.3 The Park51 mosque quickly attracted international
attention,4 and the question of whether the state5 could restrict the mosque
became entangled in a web of legal and “cultural sensitivity” arguments.6
This Comment advocates an international human rights framework to
address the issue of whether the state can regulate religious land use, such as
Park51.7 In confronting these religious freedom issues, the United States would
be wise to look to international human rights norms on permissible limitations,
as it already does to evaluate the religious activities of other countries.8 An
international framework not only ensures a high barrier to any government

1 Jonathan Mann, Manhattan Mosque Plan Stokes Controversy, CNN (Aug. 6, 2010), http://articles.cnn.
com/2010-08-06/politics/mann.mosque.ground.zero_1_new-mosque-cordoba-house-state-religion;
Cristian
Salazar, Building Damaged in 9/11 To Be Mosque for NYC Muslims, USA TODAY (May 5, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-05-07-mosque-ground-zero_N.htm.
2 PARK51 COMMUNITY CENTER, http://blog.park51.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter PARK51
OFFICIAL WEBSITE].
3 Michael Gormley & Verena Dobnik, Giuliani Supports Moving Mosque Away from WTC, MSNBC
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38776009/ns/us_news-life.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 46–51.
5 This Comment uses the term “state” in a broad sense to refer to the United States as well as local and
state governments. The international framework advanced in this Comment can be applied to all religious
land-use controversies. Here, the issue is whether New York may regulate the construction of Park51, but
these limitations are through the obligations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (“RLUIPA”), the Supreme Court decisions, the Constitution, and arguably international human rights
norms. Thus, in the case of Park51, New York would be the relevant state for these permissible limitations, but
the United States as a whole should look to international human rights norms in the challenges to religious
controversies and to refine its own jurisprudence on religious limitations.
6 See infra Part I.A. This Comment addresses “cultural sensitivity” arguments in Part IV.
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part I.B.
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restriction on the Muslim community’s right to build a house of worship, but
also fills in gaps in current U.S. domestic law and land-use statutes.9
This Comment is a limitations analysis on religious land use in the United
States. An examination of the legal scope of religious freedom requires looking
at two aspects of religious liberty: first, the language that provides for the right
itself, and second, the language that identifies the circumstances when the state
may properly restrict the right.10 President Barack Obama identified the
language that provides for the right of religion and the initial inquiry into
Park51 when he said that “Muslims have the . . . right to practice their
religion . . . [including] to build a place of worship.”11 Indeed, most written
constitutions in the world, including the U.S. Constitution, 12 and international
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),13 contain a clause for freedom of religion or belief
and recognize that religious freedom is both an individual and a group right.
However, international instruments such as the ICCPR also include a
“limitations clause” that provides for limitations on religious freedom “to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.”14 The scope of the right of religion receives
“disproportionate attention” in the two-stage religion analysis.15 While scholars
and commentators have addressed Park51 through the constitutional guarantee
of religion, this Comment focuses on the legal scope of this right through the
lens of the second stage: the permissible limitations on exercising the right to
build Park51. Indeed, amidst the controversy, the real inquiry is whether the
state can properly limit the right of the group to construct its mosque in this
location.
This Comment embraces an international law framework and argues that
the state may restrict religious land uses under certain permissible limitations
9

See infra Part III.B.
T. Jeremy Gunn, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief: A
Comparative Perspective, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. vii, viii (2005) [hereinafter Gunn, Permissible Scope].
11 David Batty, Barack Obama Defends Plans for Ground Zero Mosque, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/14/barack-obama-ground-zero-mosque.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
13 As this Comment discusses later, the ICCPR also provides that “[everyone] shall have the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18.1,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
14 Id. art. 18.3.
15 Gunn, Permissible Scope, supra note 10, at viii.
10
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that serve a public interest (what international human rights law calls the
“public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others”).16 However, because any permissible limitation on religious
activities must be proportional and must not discriminate against a particular
religion,17 this Comment argues that government restriction of Park51 is illegal
under international human rights norms, as accepted by the United States.
Further, this Comment illustrates that the “cultural sensitivity” argument
adopted by the media and politicians,18 while a valuable part of the analysis of
permissible limitations on religious freedom, ultimately fails with respect to
Park51.19
In Part I, this Comment presents background information on the current
controversy surrounding the construction of Park51 and explains how and why
international human rights norms are useful for analyzing this controversy. Part
II delineates the general grounds for permissible limitations of religious
activities under international human rights norms and presents an international
law framework. Next, Part III analyzes the U.S. interpretation of religious
protections and limitations against the backdrop of international human rights
standards, especially the ICCPR, and argues that international standards should
inform and reinforce U.S. law on religious liberty. Part IV addresses the
lingering sensitivity issue surrounding Park51, argues that the concept of
“cultural sensitivity” is an implicit component of this limitations process, and
provides comparison to other disputes involving cultural sensitivity. Lastly,
Part V applies this analysis to the Park51 mosque, determines that the state
cannot restrict the construction of Park51, and recommends that the state
maintain this view as construction of the Park51 mosque moves forward.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Controversy: The Park51 Mosque Near Ground Zero
Ten years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the proposed
construction of a mosque near the World Trade Center site has sparked
international controversy.20 In December 2009, reports first surfaced of the

16
17
18
19
20

ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.3.
Id. arts. 26, 27.
Supra Parts I.A, IV.
Supra Parts IV, V.B.
Mann, supra note 1; Salazar, supra note 1.
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planned construction of the “Cordoba House”21 to replace the building that
formerly housed a Burlington Coat Factory, located two blocks from the site of
the World Trade Center.22 In fact, the location of the proposed mosque is so
close to the World Trade Center site that debris from the September 11
airliners had damaged the building.23 A local community board, Community
Board 1, reviewed the plans for the Cordoba House and passed a resolution in
support of the project, although the chairman emphasized “that the board had
no authority to approve or disapprove of a house of worship, per se.”24 Further,
on August 3, 2010, the New York City Landmark Preservation Commission
approved plans to tear down the building that currently occupies 45–47 Park
Place to clear the space for the construction of Park51.25 With the approval of
the Landmark Preservation Commission, no obstacles remained with respect to
local zoning laws.26
The name “Cordoba House” was the source of one level of controversy.27
Some commentators believe that the name referenced the Muslim victory over
the Christian Spaniards and the subsequent conversion of the Cordoba church
into the third largest mosque in the world.28 Perhaps in response to the
backlash of the name “Cordoba House,” the planners of the mosque changed
the name to Park51,29 the name of the street and its principal address.
Many Americans, such as former democratic New York City Mayor Ed
Koch, concluded that “there is no room for discussion” on the legal right to
build a mosque near Ground Zero.30 Senator Orrin Hatch noted that it may not
be a “good idea” to build the mosque given “inflamed passions of the
community,” but conceded that “[c]learly . . . the proponents of the mosque
have a legal and a constitutional right to build.”31 On August 13, 2010,
President Obama endorsed “the right to build a place of worship and a
21

Ralph Blumenthal, Muslim Prayers and Renewal Near Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A1.
Salazar, supra note 1.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Bobby Ghosh, The Moderate Imam Behind the ‘Ground Zero Mosque,’ TIME (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008432,00.html.
26 Id.
27 Raymond Ibrahim, The Two Faces of the Ground Zero Mosque, MIDDLE E. F. (June 22, 2010),
http://www.meforum.org/2678/ground-zero-mosque.
28 Id.
29 PARK 51 OFFICIAL WEBSITE, supra note 2.
30 Daniel Halper, Ed Koch: Ground Zero Mosque ‘Insensitive,’ WKLY. STANDARD (Aug. 4, 2010, 4:45
PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/ed-koch-ground-zero-mosque-insensitive.
31 John Schwartz, Zoning Law Aside, Mosque Projects Face Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at A11.
22
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community center on private property in lower Manhattan.”32 Polls have
shown that Americans, including fifty-two percent of New Yorkers, oppose the
construction of the site,33 but one poll found that eighty percent of New
Yorkers believe that there is a legal right to build the mosque.34
While most scholars and commentators, even if opposed to the construction
of Park51, believe there is a “legal right” to build the mosque,35 few have
commented on whether there may be a permissible limitation on this right. In
the context of an international debate regarding whether the state may restrict
Park51, the permissible limitation angle provides important clarification
regarding potential state interference with construction of the mosque. An
international framework is useful for a limitations analysis because it is a
model that the United States has actively embraced.
Further, the issue of cultural sensitivity is an important one within this
international law analysis of Park51. Many of the mosque’s opponents have
embraced a sensitivity argument.36 Former New York City Mayor Rudy
Giuliani supports moving the proposed Islamic center to land away from the
Ground Zero site.37 Giuliani said, “[T]he question here is a question of
sensitivity.”38 Other commentators have echoed and exceeded Giuliani’s
sensitivity sentiment. Charles Krauthammer wrote in The Washington Post that
“putting up a monument to Islam in this place is not just insensitive but
provocative.”39 Another writer said that in the case of Park51, “good taste and
common sense should prevail, or what Mayor Bloomberg . . . calls ‘special

32 Romesh Ratnesar, Ground Zero: Exaggerating the Jihadist Threat, TIME (Aug. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011400,00.html.
33 Jillian Scharr, Most New Yorkers Oppose Ground Zero Mosque: Poll, NBC NEW YORK (Aug. 17,
2010), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/New-Yorkers-Oppose-Ground-Zero-Mosque-Poll-97602569.
html; Michael Barbaro & Marjorie Connelly, New York Poll Finds Wariness for Muslim Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 31, 2010, at A1 (“Two-Thirds of New York City residents want a planned Muslim community center and
mosque to be relocated to a less controversial site farther away from ground zero in Lower Manhattan,
including many who describe themselves as supporters of the project, according to a New York Times poll.”).
34 Tom Topousis, Two-Thirds of New York Residents Think Ground Zero Mosque Should Be Moved,
N.Y. POST, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/two_thirds_moved_new_york_residents_QDFQfk
K7POSf8FJHxLKBnL (last updated Sept. 24, 2010, 11:34 AM); see, e.g., Mosque-Building and Its
Discontents, ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/
islamic_cultural_centre_sorta_near_ground_zero.
35 Topousis, supra note 34.
36 William Saletan, Sensitive Conservatism: Is a Mosque Near Ground Zero “Insensitive”?, SLATE (Aug.
23, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2264754.
37 Gormley & Dobnik, supra note 3.
38 Saletan, supra note 36.
39 Charles Krauthammer, Moral Myopia at Ground Zero, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2010, at A23.
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sensitivity.’”40 Jonah Goldberg invoked “appropriateness,” arguably a
synonym of sensitivity: “the analogies all work fine in this sense: they all
illuminate the fact that the relevant question here is appropriateness,
decency.”41 Mark Radulich wrote that it “is in fact sensitivity that lies at the
heart of this issue.”42 Finally, one publication reported that the majority of
politicians have invoked a sensitivity argument, conceding that while the
mosque might be legally defensible, it is “insensitive.”43
Thus, the discussion surrounding the Park51 controversy involves both
legal and cultural sensitivity arguments, invoked by the mass media and
politicians. An international religious framework would respond to
international issues of religious liberty, provide a human rights standard to
judge religious liberty controversies, and address the “cultural sensitivity”
argument. The next Subpart explains the reasons why an international law
analysis provides compelling insight into this unique religious land-use
controversy.
B. International Law and Religious Liberty
As discussed above, the Park51 mosque has become an international
controversy. Before an analysis of an international framework in Part II, it is
necessary to explain why the United States should embrace international
human rights norms when dealing with religious issues such as Park51. The
United States should look toward international human rights ideals as a guiding
light to the Park51 controversy. The aversion of many scholars to international
legal norms in the application of U.S. law cannot be justified in the category of
religious liberty. Indeed, international law holds particular importance in the
area of religious liberty in the United States.44 A review of religious expression
40

Rich Lowry, The Ground Zero Mosque: Not the Place, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2010, 12:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/243643/ground-zero-mosque-not-place-rich-lowry.
41 Jonah Goldberg, What the Mosque Debate Is, and Isn’t, About, AMERICAN (Aug. 17, 2010, 8:56 AM),
http://blog.american.com/?p=18318.
42 Mark Radulich, On the Ground Zero Mosque and Sensitivity, BLOGGER NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 3,
2010), http://www.bloggernews.net/125015.
43 Sense
and Sensitivity, ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2010/08/mosque_near_ground_zero (“Harry Reid, the leader of the Democrats in the
Senate, stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Sarah Palin—an unusual position for them both—when he took this
stance yesterday. Barack Obama also seems to have arrived in much the same place, first saying on Friday that
he supported the construction of the mosque and then explaining over the weekend that he was talking about
constitutional rights, rather than tact.”).
44 JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 271 (3d ed.
2011).
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in the context of international human rights law is an important one for three
main reasons, discussed below.
First, the eyes of the world are upon the United States as it deals with this
sensitive and important issue. The Park51 mosque was one of the most
followed news stories of 2010.45 Newspapers and leaders around the world
have covered and opined on the events and issues surrounding the proposed
construction of Park51. A U.K. newspaper reported on the support for and
opposition to the mosque.46 An Israeli newspaper commented on the legal
arguments protecting freedom of religion,47 and a Russian news show reported
on “freedom of faith versus freedom of speech” in the United States with
respect to a “Why there?” ad.48 In Lebanon, The Daily Star reported that the
Cordoba Initiative has every right to build a mosque by Ground Zero, but that
it might be better served as a cultural tourist center.49 An article from the
United Arab Emirates expressed concern over religious persecution and
“Islamaphobia” at the hands of U.S. politicians.50 In Hong Kong’s South China
Morning Post, Michael Chugani insinuated that the United States has no right
to “try to deny Muslims their right to build a mosque” in Manhattan because
the United States accuses China of religious persecution.51 It is apparent that
the international community is watching. The importance of international
norms cannot be underestimated given the international attention to this
controversy.
Second, to apply international human rights norms to the Park51
controversy would only be to hold the United States to the same standards it
uses to evaluate religious liberty issues in other countries.52 Reviewing Park51
45 See No Comment? Not Here: Our Most Talkative Posts of 2010, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010), http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/most-commented-posts-of-2010/.
46 Philip Sherwell, Barack Obama Backs Ground Zero Mosque, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 13, 2010), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/7945558/Barack-Obama-backsGround-Zero-mosque.html.
47 See Hal Goodman, What If They Opposed a Synagogue?, JERUSALEM POST (Aug. 22, 2010, 8:42 PM),
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=185619.
48 Russia Today, ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ Ad: Why There?, WEEK (Aug. 23, 2010), http://theweek.com/
article/index/206397/ground-zero-mosque-ad-why-there.
49 Jamil K. Mroue, Fathom the Faith at Ground Zero, DAILY STAR (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=10&article_ID=118249&categ_id=17#axzz0xT7ll3q4.
50 Tony Karon, Islam Is the New Bogeyman in a Time of US Uncertainty, NAT’L (Aug. 22, 2010, 11:45
AM), http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2010/08/22/117345.html.
51 Michael Chugani, Editorial, Public Eye, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.scmp.
com (subscription required). Specifically, the United States accused China of “suppress[ing] its Christians,
mistreat[ing] Tibetan monks, and rough[ing] up Muslims in Xinjiang.” Id.
52 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 270.
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in light of international law would integrate U.S. foreign policy with U.S.
domestic law, and allow the United States to deal with internal religious liberty
issues in a way that is consistent with its outward actions. The United States
uses international standards on religious expression “on a regular basis with
respect to other countries.”53 The executive and legislative branches already
accept international law on religious freedom to make decisions abroad. For
example, the U.S. State Department is an executive branch agency that issues
reports every year on religious liberty.54 These reports use international norms
to evaluate the laws and activities dealing with religion in other nations. The
introduction to the 2010 report illustrates the degree to which the United States
embraces international human rights:
The values of religious freedom are universal, enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This report is an important
tool in the effort to ensure respect for these values. The United States
takes seriously its international commitments and, in the President’s
words, “Our nation’s enduring commitment to the universal human
right of religious freedom extends beyond our borders as we advocate
55
for all who are denied the ability to choose and live their faith.”

The purpose of these reports is to shape U.S. foreign policy.56 Both the
executive and the legislative branches are involved; these bodies make
recommendations directly to Congress and the executive branch, which may
impose economic sanctions to countries that neglect to meet international
norms on religious freedom.57
Further, in 1998, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act
(“IRFA”) to “condemn violations of religious freedom, and to promote, and to
assist other governments in the promotion of, the fundamental right to freedom
of religion.”58 When a country violates international protections on religious
liberty, the IRFA authorizes the President to condition foreign aid, loan
53

Id.
Id.
55 U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2010, intro., available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/
148658.htm (“[The Obama] Administration will continue to oppose growing trends in many parts of the world
to restrict religious expression. Faith can bring us closer to one another, and our freedom to practice our faith
and follow our conscience is central to our ability to live in harmony.”).
56 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 270.
57 Id.
58 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2789 (1998); WITTE &
NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 270–71; Gordon Smith, Protecting the Weak: Religious Liberty in the Twenty-First
Century, 1999 BYU L. REV. 479, 483 (1999) (noting that the IRFA passed ninety-eight to zero).
54
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approval, and trade status on religious tolerance if a country violates
international protections on religious liberty.59 In addition, the United States
has actively denounced laws that discriminate against religious groups. For
example, when Russia implemented an anti-religion law, the United States
passed a resolution that condemned the Russian law.60 The U.S. resolution
called on President Yeltsin to certify that the Russian Federation had
implemented no statute or regulation that would discriminate against religious
groups in the community in violation of international instruments to which the
Russian Federation was a party, including the ICCPR.61 Thus, given that the
United States uses international human rights standards to evaluate religious
liberty controversies in other nations, it should at a minimum meet these
standards when analyzing its own religion limitations issues.
Third, modern human rights instruments capture the core of the U.S.
Constitution.62 As John Witte, Jr. has written, “the international norms on
religious liberty are—in many ways—the very norms of the American
experiment itself.”63 Modern human rights instruments echo the standards of
American constitutional freedoms, as influenced by U.S. leaders. Eleanor
Roosevelt was involved in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 (“Universal Declaration”).64 Further, the ICCPR and the
Universal Declaration include President Franklin Roosevelt’s famous “four
freedoms”:
[W]e look forward to a world founded upon four essential human
freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—
everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to
worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world. The third is
freedom from want [. . .] —everywhere in the world. The fourth is
65
freedom from fear [. . .] anywhere in the world.

59

Smith, supra note 58, at 495.
Id. at 483; see also W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Approach, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101, 102 (1998).
61 Smith, supra note 58, at 483.
62 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 269–70.
63 Id. at 269.
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]; DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 99 (3d ed.
2010).
65 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/four_freedoms/four_freedoms.html; WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 270.
60
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First Amendment jurisprudence and prevailing U.S. law, especially the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),66 are
shaped, confirmed, refined, and bolstered by U.S. participation in international
human rights instruments. The U.S. State Department has even submitted a
report to the United Nations that links RLUIPA to international religious
norms expressed in the ICCPR.67 RLUIPA, discussed further in Part III,
represents for the United States the same firm standard of religious freedom
protections for individuals and groups that are contemplated by the ICCPR.68
Even if not dispositive, the international jurisprudence is probative regarding
questions under RLUIPA. Thus, an application of international norms to
Park51 would “judge American law by an international standard that it helped
shape.”69
Thus, while an international law inquiry into the religious freedom
questions in the United States is not formally binding in some respects, these
human rights standards should be at the forefront of the analysis of Park51. To
summarize: (1) Park51 is an international controversy, (2) the United States
uses international norms to evaluate the activities of other nations regarding
religious liberty, and (3) human rights instruments both represent and integrate
the core of the U.S. Constitution with international norms. For these reasons,
the United States should look to these international standards when it evaluates
religious liberty controversies such as Park51. Part II presents a framework of
these international human rights standards.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
International law consists of a body of international rules, obligations,
instruments, and institutions.70 These international rules of conduct bind
“international actors in relations, transactions and problems that transcend
national frontiers.”71 This Part first identifies the right to build a religious
worship center as a religious right under prevailing international human rights
law. Second, this Part addresses four international human rights instruments
66

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006).
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (2005) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT], available at http://www.state.gove/g/drl/
rls/55504.htm#imple.
68 Id.
69 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 270.
70 BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 1.
71 Id.
67
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that provide for circumstances when a state may legally impose a limitation on
religious expression. In particular, the ICCPR, of which the United States is a
signatory, is at the center of the analysis of whether international law provides
for permissible limitations on religious freedom in the case of Park51. Third,
this Part argues that the limitations on religious activities that discriminate
against only one religious group are not legal under international law, and
specifically under the ICCPR and subsequent international human rights
norms. As part of the international law analysis under the ICCPR and the other
international instruments, this Comment later argues that cultural sensitivity
may, in some cases, influence these permissible limitations on religious
freedom.
A. The Right To Build a Religious Worship Center
This analysis hinges on whether worship centers, such as Park51, are part
of the protected rights under freedom of religion.72 International law and the
United States have long recognized a right to build a religious worship center
as part of the right of religious freedom. As later sections will illustrate, the
text of international human rights instruments themselves often provide a
direct right to build a religious worship center. For example, the 1981 UN
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (“1981 Declaration”) provides
specific types of religious activities protected under “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.”73 One protected category of religious liberty is the
right “to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to
establish and maintain places for these purposes.”74 Further, the 1989 Vienna
Concluding Document is an international instrument that also contains the
basic religious rights provisions relevant for the Park51 analysis: the “right of
religious communities to establish and maintain freely accessible places of
worship or assembly.”75
72 Professor Gunn explains that first the right must be identified, and then the limitations analysis can
proceed. T. Jeremy Gunn, Permissible Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief, in RELIGION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 254, 255 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2012) [hereinafter
Gunn, Permissible Limitations].
73 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981)
[hereinafter 1981 Declaration].
74 Id.
75 Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527, princ. 16c. [hereinafter
1989 Vienna Concluding Document].
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The UN Special Rapporteur for Religious Freedom,76 operating with the
provisions of the ICCPR and the 1981 Declaration as a guide, has reinforced
the right to build a place of worship in several cases, recommending to Turkish
authorities that “[t]he Government should guarantee minorities the right to
establish and maintain their own places of worship, and should allow them to
build such facilities in places where new communities have taken root.”77
Further, the Special Rapporteur has identified violations of freedom of religion
or belief that include “targeting of places of worship and other religious
buildings,” including “attacks” and “restriction of places of worship.”78 More
specifically, one report to the Commission on Human Rights that outlined
activities threatening civil and political rights, including religious intolerance,
noted that “religious minorities [in Slovenia] have recently complained about
restrictions on the exercise of their freedom of religion, including Muslims,
who are experiencing great difficulty in their efforts to build a mosque.”79 All
of these statements identify the right to build a religious worship center as a
right of religious freedom, and conversely, recognize denial of the right to
build a worship center to be a prima facie violation of religious freedom. Thus,
under the text and subsequent application of international law, the religious
land use of Park51 falls in the relevant zone of a religious right.
The United States also identifies religious worship centers as part of the
right to religious liberty. Most notably, as discussed above, the U.S. State

76 A Special Rapporteur is an individual working on behalf of the United Nations with a specific mandate
from the Commission on Human Rights. Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OFFICE U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm#
code (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). The mandate is within the scope of “special procedures,” which allows the
Human Rights Council to address specific issues in countries or overarching issues. The Special Rapporteur
investigates these human rights and releases a mission report that contains findings and recommendations. Id.
77 Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief,
Situation in Turkey, U.N. Doc. A/55/280/Add. 1 (Aug. 11, 2000) (by Abdelfatta Amor). This report found that
the government should guarantee minorities not only the right to build a worship center, but also “to teach their
religion, in places suitable for this purpose, and to train their clergy.” It is “indispensable” that the right to
religion includes the right to religious seminaries as well as including, under Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration
and the General Commentary No. 22 of the Commission of Human Rights, “the practice and teaching of
religion and belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as . . .
the freedom to establish seminars or religious schools.” Id.
78 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights on the
Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolution 10/22 Entitled “Combating Defamation of Religions,”
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/57, No. 81 (Jan. 11, 2010).
79 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious
Intolerance, ESCOR Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/63, No. 92 (Jan. 16, 2004) (by
Abdelfattah Amor).
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Department annually submits the International Religious Freedom report to
Congress in compliance with Section 102(b) of IRFA of 1998.80 This report
covers the status of international religious freedom. The most recent report
identified restrictions on freedom of religion within many countries where
communities have been unable to build a worship center.81 In addition to the
U.S. State Department, the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”) is charged with evaluating violations of
religious freedom internationally and making recommendations to both the
President and to Congress.82 In its 2010 report, the USCIRF identified “Watch
List Countries” that violate religious freedom in part by such acts that deny
both “permission to build new churches” and to “rebuild[] premises for
worship.”83
The UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Special Rapporteur reports, the
U.S. State Department, and the USCIRF all identify the right to build a
worship center as part of the right to religious freedom. These statements and
reports fully support the proposition that building the Park51 mosque falls
within a protected category of religious liberty. Thus, the core issue is whether
the state may limit the right to build Park51.
B. The International Instruments, Guarantees of Religion, and Permissible
Limitations
As discussed earlier, the analysis of the legal scope of a religious right
involves a two-step process: first, an examination of the text that provides the
right, and second, an analysis of whether the language identifies circumstances
under which there may be a permissive limitation on that right.84 While this
Comment focuses on permissive limitations, any analysis of the permissible
scope of legal limitations on the right to religion necessarily involves a
discussion of the major human rights instruments and the initial guarantees
therein. Accordingly, both the right and the limitation will be addressed. The
second step in analyzing the scope of a religious right involves whether a state
80 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/irf/index.htm.
81 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2010, available at http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148659.htm.
82 About the Commission, U.S. COMMISSION ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, http://www.uscirf.gov/
about-uscirf.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
83 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 214 (2010) (targeting both
Iran and Afghanistan as denying the religious right to build a worship center).
84 See Gunn, Permissible Scope, supra note 10, at viii.
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may properly restrict a religious guarantee under certain circumstances or in
specific contexts. While the religious believers and actors are more likely to
focus on the right they wish to exercise, states are more concerned with the
potential harms caused by extreme or inappropriate manifestations of
religion.85
1. Development of International Religious Liberties and Limitations
The modern formulation of international religious liberties began in the
mid-twentieth century.86 The horrors of World War II prompted a new
recognition of human rights norms and, in particular, the development of the
Universal Declaration.87 Led by Eleanor Roosevelt and other international
delegates, the creation of the Universal Declaration enunciates freedoms for
individuals, including rights of worship and expression, and provides the
international standard of freedom of religion.88 Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes . . . freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.”89 While countries initially adopted the
Universal Declaration as “soft” law, or a nonbinding legal instrument, the
provisions have now been recognized as human rights norms either as part of
customary international law or in other multilateral international instruments.90
The Universal Declaration identifies both the right to believe and the right
to manifest religion or belief.91 While the right to believe is absolute, the right
to manifest one’s religion is not.92 The “limitations clauses” in international
human right instruments and written constitutions stipulate the circumstances
under which a right to freedom or belief may be legally restricted. Permissible
limitations on religion or belief apply only to one’s outward manifestation and
expression; in other words, the right to manifest one’s religion is not

85 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 254 (analyzing the issues that arise under the
limitations clause with respect to freedom of religion).
86 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 271.
87 Universal Declaration, supra note 64; BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 99.
88 Universal Declaration, supra note 64, arts. 18, 19.
89 Id. art. 18.
90 BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 100.
91 Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 18.
92 Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Law Perspectives,
19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 501 (2005).
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absolute.93 Article 29 of the Universal Declaration subjects all of the rights and
freedoms to specific limitations:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
94
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

The Universal Declaration represented the advent of human rights norms,
and the instruments that followed both elaborate and formalize the Universal
Declaration. John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green aptly identify the four
major international human rights instruments that contain protections for
religious rights: (1) the ICCPR, (2) the 1981 Declaration, (3) the 1989
Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of
the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (“Vienna Concluding Document”), and (4) the 1992 United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of the Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (“Minorities Declaration”).95
2. The ICCPR
First, the United Nations adopted the ICCPR in 1966.96 Like the Universal
Declaration, the ICCPR identifies a religious right.97 Article 18 of the ICCPR
states:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
98
religion or belief in worship.

Thus, the ICCPR repeats the religious protections set forth in the Universal
Declaration and also identifies limitations that may be imposed on the freedom
93

See id. at 500–01.
Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 29.
95 John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religious Freedom, Democracy, and International Human
Rights, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583, 590 (2009). “As the international human rights instruments would
predict, religious sanctuaries . . . are sites of the most frequent and violent contests over religious liberty, and
these hotspots have long occupied courts and legislatures.” John Witte, Jr., Introduction, The Foundations and
Frontiers of Religious Liberty, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
96 BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 101.
97 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.
98 Id.
94
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to manifest one’s belief or religion. Unlike the “soft law” of the Universal
Declaration, the ICCPR is a binding international instrument,99 which the
United States ratified in 1992.100
It is important to note that Article 18 distinguishes between the “right to
freedom of thought” and the “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs.”101 Freedom of thought is absolute; a state may not derogate, impair, or
restrict this right. In contrast, the freedom to manifest one’s religion, including
the right to build worship centers, is subject to certain limitations.102 While the
Universal Declaration recognizes limitations that protect “morality, public
order and the general welfare,”103 the ICCPR expands on these limitations.
More specifically, the ICCPR includes a limitations clause within the same
article as the clause that grants freedom of religion. Article 18 subjects
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief to limitations “prescribed by law
and . . . necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedom of others.”104 The necessity requirement, in
theory, ensures that any state limitation must be proportional to the interest the
state seeks to protect. The ICCPR thus authorizes states to limit freedom of
religion or belief only if the limitation upholds morality, public order, general
welfare, public safety, or health.105 Other relevant articles of the ICCPR
include Articles 2 and 26, which prohibit discrimination based on certain
characteristics, including religion.106 Lastly, Article 27 of the ICCPR
guarantees that religious minorities have the right to “practise their own
religion.”107
In 1984, a committee of experts in Siracusa, Italy sought to clarify the
limitations on principles expressed in the ICCPR.108 The conference resulted in
the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Siracusa Principles”),109
99

BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 101.
Id.
101 ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 18(1), 18(3).
102 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 255.
103 Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 29.
104 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18(3).
105 Id.
106 Id. arts. 2, 26.
107 Id. art. 27.
108 U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on
the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
109 Id.
100
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which further articulated these limitations. According to the Siracusa
Principles, any limitation on the rights and freedoms in the ICCPR must serve
the purpose of the instrument, may not be discriminatory against a certain
group, must be a necessary response to the public need, and must be
proportional.110 The Siracusa Principles also define terms from the ICCPR. For
example, the document defines “public safety” as “protection against danger to
the safety of persons, to their life or physical integrity, or serious damage to
their property.”111 Further, “public order” includes a “sum of rules which
ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on which
society is founded”; this definition includes respect for human rights.112 The
limitations justified by public health must involve a serious threat to the health
of the population, including injury. Additionally, the Siracusa Principles
recognize that “public morals” vary across cultures and throughout time; the
document grants national authorities discretion so long as the limitation “is
essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the
community.”113 This means that the freedom to manifest one’s religion may be
restricted when the limitations are required in the interest of public safety,
public order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights of others.114
Importantly, however, any permissible limitation to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or fundamental rights of others must also be
“proportional” to the restriction imposed on the religious group.115 The
proportionality requirement is essential to determining a religious limitation.
Professor Jeremy Gunn explained that this requirement in limitations
jurisprudence assumes that there should be a “proportionate” correlation
between the interest the state seeks to protect and the right that it regulates.116
Similar to the major international human rights instruments, the European
Commission of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has explained that similar limitations
principles must be subject to “the nature of the right involved, the degree of
interference, i.e. whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,
the nature of the public interest and the degree to which it requires protection
in the circumstances of the case.”117 That regional human rights instruments
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Van der Vyver, supra note 92, at 511.
Id.; Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262.
Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262.
X & Church of Scientology v. Sweden, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 68, 73 (1997).
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have adopted this standard is a testament to its legitimacy and authority in the
international community.
The ICCPR also provides for derogation from certain rights and freedoms
when political authorities determine that there is a public emergency that
threatens the life of a nation.118 However, the measures taken to cope with the
“public emergency” must not discriminate on the ground of religion, among
other factors.119 Thus, as one scholar notes, “[e]mergency regulations
applicable to, for example, only the Muslim community would, therefore,
violate the norm enunciated in this provision [of the ICCPR].”120 One
commentator has noted that “[l]imitations clauses have . . . largely swallowed
the remaining guarantees of religious liberty in international human rights
instruments.”121 A government may invoke the limitations clauses in the
ICCPR and the Universal Declaration to restrict the religious acts of a minority
group by characterizing the activities as harming the “general welfare” or
disrupting “public order.”122 While state officials are likely to be concerned
about the political dangers of religious radicalism or extremism, a government
might nonetheless restrict religion absent such real harm by focusing on
perceived dangers.123
3. The Subsequent International Human Rights Instruments
This Subpart addresses the human rights instruments that followed the
Universal Declaration and the ICCPR. The 1981 Declaration124 parallels the
ICCPR, but provides more specific guidance into the types of religious
activities protected under “freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”125
One of the concrete guarantees enumerated in Article 6 of the 1981

118

Van der Vyver, supra note 92, at 512–13.
Id. at 513.
120 Id.
121 Nathan A. Adams, IV, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty Beyond the Border,
33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 45 (2000).
122 Id. at 45–46.
123 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 255–56. The U.S. government’s attack at the Mount
Carmel Center near Waco, Texas is an extreme instance of the limitation of religion for the “general welfare.”
While the factors may be broadly interpreted to allow state authorities wide discretion to limit religious
manifestations and activities, discrimination and proportionality may prevent such limitations from being a
permissible exercise of a state’s power. Id.
124 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 271.
125 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 1. For a detailed analysis of the 1981 Declaration, see Carolyn
Evans, Time for a Treaty? The Legal Sufficiency of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination, 2007 BYU L. REV. 617.
119
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Declaration provides relevant guidance for the current Park51 controversy: the
right “[t]o worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to
establish and maintain places for these purposes.”126 The 1981 Declaration,
similar to the ICCPR and the earlier Universal Declaration, also contains a
limitations clause for manifestation of religion.127 Under the 1981 Declaration,
states may restrict and regulate religious activities to protect public safety,
order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.128
While Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR prohibit discrimination based on
religion, the 1981 Declaration contains more restrictive and elaborate
provisions against discrimination. In fact, the 1981 Declaration broadly defines
discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or
impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.”129 These antidiscrimination
provisions prohibit “discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons,
or person”130 and calls upon states to “take effective measures to prevent and
eliminate discrimination.”131 Effective measures include laws that forbid
discrimination.132 As Natan Lerner writes, “[The 1981 Declaration] was an
important breakthrough in the prolonged struggle to achieve for religious
groups at least some of the protection granted in present human rights law to
racial and ethnic groups.”133
The Vienna Concluding Document is the third international instrument that
contains the basic religious rights provisions relevant to the Park51 analysis.
Similar to the 1981 Declaration, the Concluding Document contains concrete
guarantees of religious liberty and expression.134 Of particular relevance to the
Park51 debate is the “[r]ight of religious communities to establish and maintain
freely accessible places of worship or assembly.”135 Further, the Concluding
Document protects against discrimination and calls upon states to “take

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 6.
Id. art. 1.
Id.
Id. art. 2.
Id.
Id. art. 4.
Id.
NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (2d ed. 2003).
1989 Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 75, princ. 16c.
Id.
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effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination against individuals
or communities.”136
Lastly, the 1992 Minorities Declaration contains the most specific
protections for religious minorities and the right to self-determination. The
right to self-determination “guarantees a religious community the right to
practice its religion, an ethnic community the right to promote its
culture . . . without undue state interference or unnecessary legal
restrictions.”137 This has specific relevance in the religious context, especially
the Muslim community and Park51.
C. Discrimination
While international law allows for specific limitations on freedom of
religion, it also imposes an additional legal layer on these restrictions: any
limitation imposed on freedom of religion or belief must not discriminate
against a particular religious group.138 Because of this restriction, state policies
that purport to serve the “general welfare,” “public order,” or “public health”
might nonetheless be discriminatory if they target a specific religious group.
Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination in the context of religion:
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law . . . [T]he law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as . . . religion.”139 The 1981
Declaration explained and expanded on the religious principles articulated in
the ICCPR, and included prohibitions on religious discrimination.140 The
adoption of the 1981 Declaration and international documents that followed
therefore reinforced the international community’s firm prohibition of
intolerance based on religion.
Thus, states that are parties to the ICCPR are under an international
obligation to promulgate policies that do not discriminate against a particular
religious group. If there had been any doubt regarding the strong
136

Id.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. Supp. No. 49 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/135 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Minorities Declaration].
138 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 26.
139 Id.
140 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, arts. 2, 4.
137
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antidiscrimination stance in the ICCPR, the 1981 Declaration and subsequent
instruments discussed above clarified that any limitation on religious activities
must not discriminate against a particular religious entity. This has particular
relevance for the Park51 controversy because only the Muslim religious
community is at the center of the dispute. As this Comment later shows, these
discrimination clauses prevent the state from targeting a specific religion, and
thus make limitations on Park51 impermissible.
The next Part analyzes the permissible limitations of religion in the United
States, as informed by the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and other human
rights instruments and jurisprudence. Because the controversy surrounding
Park51 is centered in the United States, the next Part links the discussion of
international human rights law to U.S. law.
III. THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PERMISSIBLE
LIMITATIONS ON RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND LAND USE
Religious liberty in the United States is intertwined with international
human rights instruments. The United States, of course, has its own religious
liberty under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
sundry state constitutions, and all manner of federal and state statutes.141 These
instruments have given the United States a strong tradition of religious liberty
protection.142 In this modern post-9/11 era, however, the United States would
do well to look to international human rights norms to refine its own principles
and application of religious liberty. In particular, the treatment of religious
minorities in the United States can use substantial fleshing out against the
backdrop of international law.
This Part first discusses the role of international law, and specifically the
ICCPR, in a religious liberty and limitations analysis in the United States.
Second, this Comment analyzes Supreme Court jurisprudence and portions of
RLUIPA143 that are relevant to limitations a state may impose on religious
rights. The Supreme Court cases and RLUIPA are important because they
define the implicit limitations through their strict scrutiny or heightened
rational review regimes.144 In U.S. constitutional law, there are no explicit
141 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
142 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 265–66.
143 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
144 See infra Part III.B.
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limitations, but “limitations” language is viewed through the mirror image of
what is considered to be a sufficiently “compelling state interest” to meet strict
scrutiny or a sufficiently “important state interest” to meet a heightened
rational review.145 This Part argues that while RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny
standard comes closer to the ICCPR norms, the United States should embrace
international human rights norms to both close the gaps in and maintain a strict
scrutiny regime against potential discriminatory treatment.
A. Religious Rights and Limitations, the ICCPR, and the United States
In many ways, the United States has embraced the religious protections and
limitations embodied in the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR. The
Constitution itself echoes many of these international norms, and “[t]hese
international human rights instruments both confirm and prioritize several of
the founding principles of religious liberty in America—liberty of conscience,
freedom of exercise, religious equality, religious pluralism, separation of
church and state, and no establishment of religion.”146 These principles form
the backbone of international law, and the state may restrict the exercise of
religion only by a proportional regulation that protects a state interest.147 These
state interests, as a reminder, include limitations “[p]rescribed by law
and . . . necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedom of others.”148 As this Part discusses below, the
compelling interest test used in the United States comports with the permissive
limitations clause in the ICCPR. However, first it is necessary to explain the
obligations of the United States under the ICCPR.
The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992.149 When the U.S. Senate
ratified the ICCPR, however, it did not give unlimited consent to the
international treaty; rather, it accepted the obligations of the ICCPR with
several reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”).150
145 See id. for a discussion on the strict scrutiny regime in the United States that serves as limitations
language for religious rights.
146 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 277.
147 Id.
148 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.3.
149 BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 100.
150 See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1993).
For a discussion of treaty-making power and the role of RUDs, see BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 168 (“The
Senate can condition its advice and consent on the attachment of various reservations, understandings, and
declarations (“RUDs”) of the treaty. Although only reservations purport to change the legal effect of a
treaty.”).
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Importantly, none of these fourteen RUDs entirely relieves the United States of
its duties under the religious liberty clauses in the instrument.151 Yet, the
obligations of the United States under the ICCPR involve two important
nuances relevant to this Comment.
First, the United States accepted the ICCPR with an “understanding” in
regards to its requirements, which are set forth in Articles 2(1) and 26.152 When
the United States ratified the ICCPR, it clarified its position through a state
“understanding” that it may make distinctions based on categories such as
religion and race that are at least rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.153 Because “understandings” are statements only of interpretation
assumed to be consistent with the treaty, the nondiscrimination understanding
does not block U.S. obligations to comply with the ICCPR.154 Understandings
do not purport to change the legal effect of a treaty.155 Therefore, while it is
important to explain the understanding discussed above, it does not diminish
the obligations of the United States under the religious exercise and limitations
clause of the ICCPR.156 Further, most commentators, including the American
Bar Association, have concluded that the understanding dealing with
nondiscrimination is unnecessary because U.S. law generally complies with the
nondiscrimination clauses in the ICCPR.157 The American Civil Liberties
Union also opined that “[t]his understanding is . . . at best superfluous, [and] at
worst a misstatement of our jurisprudence.”158
Second, the ICCPR is not self-executing.159 Treaties that are not selfexecuting require implementing legislation to make them enforceable in U.S.
courts.160 Congress can regulate the right to manifest one’s religion or belief by
implementing the ICCPR. In fact, the ICCPR directs state parties “to take
necessary steps . . . to adopt such legislative [and] other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the [ICCPR].”161 Although
151

Id.
Stewart, supra note 150, at 1196.
153 Id. at 1183; Jeri Nazary Sute, Reviving RFRA: Congressional Use of Treaty-Implementing Powers To
Protect Religious Exercise Rights, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1535, 1565 (1998).
154 Stewart, supra note 150, at 1183.
155 BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 168.
156 Sute, supra note 153, at 1565.
157 Stewart, supra note 150, at 1197.
158 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 102d Cong. 171 (1991).
159 BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 101.
160 Id.
161 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
152
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the United States has not formally implemented the ICCPR through legislation,
it has captured its principles in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”) and RLUIPA.162 While neither RFRA nor RLUIPA is explicitly
based on the ICCPR, the statutes effectively, if not formally, implement
Articles 18 and 26 of the ICCPR. In fact, as discussed in Part I, the U.S. State
Department emphasized the relationship between these statutes and the ICCPR
when it submitted a report, entitled “Implementation of Specific Provisions of
the Covenant,” to the United Nations in 2005.163 The report linked Article 18
of the ICCPR to the RFRA and RLUIPA legislation in the United States,164
reflecting the government’s belief that these instruments fulfill the aim of the
religious liberty in the ICCPR. RFRA and RLUIPA, in fact, adopt for the
United States the same firm standard of religious freedom protections for
individuals and groups mandated by the ICCPR.165 The international
jurisprudence on proper limitations on religious freedom is thus useful not only
for foreign policy, but also for questions arising under RLUIPA and in the
Park51 controversy. The next Subpart discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence
that reads limitations on freedom of religion into the First Amendment and
explains RLUIPA in fuller detail.

162 RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1993). This Comment focuses on
RLUIPA, the predecessor of RFRA.
163 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67.
164 Id.
165 After the decision in Boerne that declared RFRA unconstitutional as to state and local governments,
some scholars indeed suggested that the treaty-implementing powers of Congress could provide a compelling
basis for a new statute to protect religious exercise and activities with respect to land use. In 1920, the
Supreme Court’s Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), holding allowed the federal government nearly
boundless power to implement treaties, including those regarding matters usually reserved to the states. The
text of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress the power to implement legislation to fulfill the goals of the
treaty: first, the President “shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur,” second, “all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” and third, Congress
has the power to make all laws “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
art. VI, cl. 2, art. I, § 8; Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing
Powers in Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1415, 1418 (1994); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, God and the Land: A Holy War Between Religious
Exercise and Community Planning and Development, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. viii, viii (2009).
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B. The Supreme Court and RLUIPA on Permissible Limitations
1. The Supreme Court
The U.S. Constitution does not have an explicit limitations clause akin to
Article 18 of the ICCPR.166 But the U.S. Supreme Court has read certain
limitations into the First Amendment guarantee that Congress shall make no
law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.167As discussed earlier, the ICCPR
requires a proportionality and necessity standard for any government
restriction on religious expression; this would be a permissive limitation on a
manifestation of religion.168 The U.S. Supreme Court developed the “strict
scrutiny” test in the Supreme Court cases of Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin
v. Yoder,169 and later Congress embraced the test in RFRA and in the more
recent RLUIPA.170 The strict scrutiny test, calling for a “compelling state
interest” and the “least restrictive alternative” for achieving that interest,171
largely parallels the necessity and proportionality requirements set out in the
ICCPR.172
However, later U.S. Supreme Court cases,173 culminating in Employment
Division v. Smith, lowered the threshold from strict scrutiny to a heightened
rational basis, and this runs afoul of the ICCPR’s requirements of necessity and
proportionality as the standard used in free exercise cases.174 The ICCPR
would still mandate the use of strict scrutiny to fulfill the requirements of
necessity and proportionality.175 Fortunately, as discussed next, RLUIPA
replaced the heightened rational basis with a strict scrutiny regime, but there
remain some significant gaps.

166

Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 257.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
168 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72 at 261.
169 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
170 See infra Part B.2.
171 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
172 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 261–62.
173 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
174 For a discussion on proportionality and necessity, see Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at
262.
175 Id. at 261–62.
167
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2. RLUIPA
Particularly relevant to this controversy is RLUIPA,176 passed by Congress
and signed into law in 2000.177 While RLUIPA was not predicated on the
treaty powers of Congress, it attempts to adopt for the United States the same
standard contemplated by the ICCPR. Congress limited RLUIPA to land-use
laws and regulations governing prisoners and other institutionalized persons,178
in part because Congressional findings determined that “covert” religious
discrimination was prevalent in these contexts.179 Here, this discussion is
concerned only with religious land use, the very heart of the Park51
controversy.
RLUIPA uses a strict scrutiny regime and sets a high bar for any
government action that would impose zoning or other restrictions on a
religious institution.180 The land-use provisions of RLUIPA include a
requirement of equal treatment: “No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”181 Any such
action must serve a “compelling government interest” while also being “the
least restrictive means” of furthering that interest.182 Further, the requirements
set forth in RLUIPA ensure that local governments do not discriminate against
a religious group that desires to build a house of worship unless the
government has “cogent reasons,” or permissible limitations, for imposing
restrictions.183 Indeed, this “strict scrutiny” test for religious exercise claims is
in line with the international human rights instruments. Thus, RLUIPA offers a
statutory substitute to the Free Exercise Clause for religious land users who are
subject to burdensome or discriminatory land-use regulations, and this federal
statute uses the same strict scrutiny review that the ICCPR mandates and that
pre-Smith free exercise law mandated.184 RLUIPA imposes a federal standard

176

RLUIPA was enacted more recently than RFRA.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc; Salkin & Lavine, supra note 165, at viii.
178 Salkin & Lavine, supra note 165, at viii.
179 Id. (citing 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch,
Kennedy, and Reid)).
180 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
181 Id. § 2000cc(b)(1).
182 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL RELIGIOUS LAND USE
PROTECTIONS, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec_topics/religiousdiscrimination/rluipa_guide.pdf.
183 Salkin & Lavine, supra note 165, at ix.
184 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177
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that compels local governments to balance government interests properly when
imposing limitations.185
Further, as discussed in the international framework in Part I, the
international human rights norms also explicitly require that any limitation on
religious expression does not discriminate against a particular religious
group.186 RLUIPA additionally embodies international norms through its
antidiscrimination mandate embodied in the strict scrutiny regime. Because
freedom of religion is much more of an equality right than a liberty right in the
United States, government action that restricts one religious group’s exercise
of rights, while excluding others that may be similarly situated, violates the
Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses. Thus, the
limitation on a religious group is permissible under the Constitution as long as
all other religious groups in the same context share the restriction.187 This
distinction is important: restricting a mosque but allowing a church or a
synagogue in the same location, for example, might be an impermissible
limitation. However, a restriction that serves a government interest and
restricts all religious groups and activities might be permissible.
While RLUIPA echoes some of the same standards set forth in the ICCPR,
it is important to note that, in the United States, a mere statutory right to build
and maintain a worship center is not universally automatic. Religious worship
centers, such as churches, mosques, and synagogues, can be restricted for
traffic concerns, foreclosed in certain neighborhoods, and regulated for other
zoning and landmark preservation issues.188 These restrictions are considered
conditions of the right of religious freedom and not limitations that must
satisfy proportionality and necessity requirements. RLUIPA’s legislative
history, by sponsors Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy, makes clear that
the “[A]ct does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use
regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from applying for
variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief
provisions in land use regulations, where available without discrimination or
unfair delay.”189
185

Salkin & Lavine, supra note 165, at ix.
See supra Part II.C.
187 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or
Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1187, 1211 (2005).
188 For a discussion on RLUIPA fact patterns, see Karla L. Chaffee & Dwight H. Merriam, Conflicts over
Land-Use and Religious Freedom: Six Fact Patterns of Substantial Burden on RLUIPA: Lessons for Potential
Litigants, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 437 (2009).
189 146 CONG. REC., supra note 179, at S7774, S7775 (2000).
186
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Some commentators have suggested that RLUIPA should apply to building
codes and land-use regulations.190 While building codes and aesthetic
regulations appear to be facially neutral, the implementation of these
regulations requires individual determinations that are subject to
discriminatory action.191 Facially neutral regulations that purport to serve
safety, public health, and historic and aesthetic regulation can mask
discrimination, and thus the courts should scrutinize building codes and other
regulations. Strengthening the strict scrutiny regime would bring RLUIPA
more fully in line with the ICCPR and prevent discrimination under otherwise
facially neutral laws.
Despite some gaps, statutes such as RLUIPA bring the United States closer
to international religious freedom norms and permissible limitations on
religious freedom. Like the ICCPR, U.S. domestic law should not allow a
government to restrict religious activities if the limitation targets and applies to
only one specific religious entity. In dealing with the international cause
célèbre surrounding the Park51 mosque, however, the United States would be
wise to embrace the strict scrutiny regime that is in line with the requirements
of the ICCPR to help eradicate the religious discrimination that minorities can
and have faced under the rational review regime introduced by Smith.192
RLUIPA is a step in the right direction, but we should encourage courts to
remember the importance of this strict scrutiny regime by pointing to the
international human rights instruments. While some commentators disagree
with this approach,193 there is a clear bridge that connects these international
treaty obligations to current U.S. domestic law.
IV. CULTURAL SENSITIVITY AND LIMITATIONS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
As discussed in Part I, one of the core popular and political arguments
surrounding the construction of Park51 is the notion of “cultural sensitivity.”194
Because this sensitivity argument is at the forefront of the political debate
regarding the location of Park51, it requires careful consideration in this
analysis. While cultural sensitivity may invoke a moral and emotional
190 See generally Shelley Ross Saxer, Assessing RLUIPA’s Application to Building Codes and Aesthetic
Land Use Regulation, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 623 (2009).
191 Id. at 629.
192 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
193 See, e.g., Douglas Laylock, Religious Freedom and International Human Rights in the United States
Today, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 951 (1998).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 36–43.
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rationale, this concept is not divorced from the law. This Comment argues that
cultural sensitivity is diffused into broad categories of public interest, which
factor into the permissible limitations analysis set forth by the ICCPR and
other international human rights instruments. By calling it “cultural
sensitivity,” this Comment argues that the term encompasses religious land
use, symbols, and expression that cause certain conflict because of the content,
location, or other context. Cultural sensitivity is not considered fully for its
legal presence in a limitations analysis, but this Part argues that cultural
sensitivity is indeed a factor in the limitations analysis. However, Part V later
illustrates that while cultural sensitivity is helpful to understand the Park51
controversy, it is not dispositive. But cultural sensitivity has its place in the
permissible limitations analysis on religious expression.
This Part defines and locates “cultural sensitivity” by first identifying its
application in the permissible religious limitations framework. Second, this
Part illustrates the role of cultural sensitivity in First Amendment jurisprudence
of freedom of speech and analogizes the concept to the right of religious
expression invoked in international human rights instruments and in the U.S.
Constitution. Third, this Part presents an incident of religious land use and
cultural sensitivity.
A. What Is “Cultural Sensitivity”?
International human rights norms have reflected the idea of cultural
sensitivity. Cultural sensitivity is often infused in incidents and issues that
inflame human passions, such as freedom of religion and other protected
liberties. While the law does not often recognize sensitivity directly, this
analysis illustrates how cultural sensitivity is either masked by other
terminology in the law or contained as undertones within the law. The most
effective way to explain sensitivity issues is through analogy and examples.
This discussion should provide a backdrop for a comparable inquiry into
Park51’s construction. First, it is necessary to locate cultural sensitivity within
the international framework for permissible limitations.
1. Cultural Sensitivity and Religion
The idea that different religious and ethnic groups can cause public outrage
that rises to legal action is not novel. Clashes between religious groups, or
between a religious group and the greater society, can create discomfort and
inflame passions of individuals who might be offended by such practices.
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Cultural sensitivity has been discussed in the context of tribal groups in the
United States.195 Sensitivity to cultural contexts has also been discussed with
respect to balancing commitments to international human rights instruments
with practices of other groups.196
International instruments that protect freedom of religion or belief, such as
the ICCPR, recognize a broad protection for religious diversities.197 When
these rights are translated into religious manifestation and action, however, the
state must ensure that the practices remain within boundaries “sensitive to the
rights and freedoms of others, and consideration of public safety, order within
the body politic, health of members of the community, and moral perceptions
of a given time and place.”198 While sensitivity is not an explicit factor, the
concept is a tangible element of the ICCPR analysis for a proper state
limitation. Cultural sensitivity is one factor to be considered in the general
limitations of religious freedom. While there is no language of “cultural
sensitivity” in the limitations clauses, this Comment argues that the factor falls
in as an implicit quality of the analysis, especially in both “public order” and
“proportionality.”199 Indeed, the power of the U.S. Congress to limit religious
freedom is implicit in itself.200 This Comment locates cultural sensitivity
legally within two categories.
First, cultural sensitivity factors into the public interest categories that
justify state restriction on religious exercise. As discussed in Part II,
international human rights instruments have identified public order and other
grounds as legitimate state interests that can limit a manifestation of a religion.
The grounds outlined in the ICCPR201 are broad categories that have not been
subject to strict interpretation,202 and they contain a malleability that embraces
sensitivity arguments. For example, Professor Gunn notes that even though
“national security” is excluded as one of the grounds upon which a state may
restrict religious expression, it would be easy for a state to characterize

195 See generally Marcia Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to
American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623 (2004).
196 See Tracy Ulltveit-Moe, Amnesty International and Indigenous Rights: Congruence of Conflict?, 31
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 717, 740 (2006–2007).
197 See supra Part II.B.2.
198 Van der Vyver, supra note 92, at 536.
199 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262–66.
200 Id.
201 The categories for permissible limitations are (1) public safety, (2) public order, (3) public health, (4)
public morals, or (5) the rights and freedoms of others. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.
202 Id.
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national security as “public order” or even “public safety.”203 He explains that
a state could take “extreme measures” in restricting a religious right with any
plausible justification that is consistent with one of the interests.204 In this
sense, a state could prohibit an offensive religious practice on the grounds that
it seeks to protect the public health or public order. Cultural sensitivity is
implicit in the analysis of the grounds outlined, especially “public order.”205 In
addition, cultural sensitivity is an element that can threaten both public safety
and public order, and sensitivity is infused in these categories.
Second, cultural sensitivity has a role in the requirements that the limitation
must be necessary or proportional.206 Proportionality analysis in the limitations
clause jurisprudence assumes that the above interests the state seeks to prevent
when imposing a restriction on religion are proportionate to the severity of the
restriction.207 Assessing the degree of religious controversies necessarily
involves cultural sensitivity, and this sensitivity is an implicit consideration in
whether the religious expression will influence factors such as public order. In
acknowledging the difficulty of assessing proportionality in religious disputes,
Professor Gunn notes examples of tough proportionality issues:
The more difficult cases are those where there are strongly competing
interests of the state and of people seeking to manifest their religion.
Should pacifists be permitted to distribute anti-war literature at the
entrance to a military base when a country is at war? Should a state
official be permitted to proselytize his employees during nonworking hours? Should Hindus be permitted to hold a religious
celebration in the city of Ayodhya, India, near the site where Hindu
nationalists had earlier destroyed the Babri mosque if the celebration
might provoke a communal clash? . . . Should state prison authorities
in the United States and Canada be required to allow the building of
ritual sweat lodges inside prisons for Native Americans? Should
women wearing the face-covering burqa be required to remove it for
state identification photos? May women wearing the burqa be
prohibited from driving automobiles or testifying in court in [sic]
208
against a criminal or before a jury?

203 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262–66. Professor Gunn analyzes the issues that arise
under the limitations clause with respect to freedom of religion.
204 Id. at 260.
205 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18; Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262–66.
206 See Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262–63.
207 Id. at 263.
208 Id.
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These examples illustrate the infusion of cultural sensitivity into the
proportionality analysis. For example, taking a conflict from above, whether
Hindus should be permitted to hold a religious event near a site where Hindu
nationalists had destroyed a mosque is a cultural sensitivity issue that factors
into public order; the controversy involved inflamed passions over a sensitive
land-use location that might threaten a public interest. Issues of public safety
and public order are legitimate, but they are also propelled by heightened
passions over temporal locations of religious expression.
2. Freedom of Speech Analogy
One reason why freedom of speech analogies are helpful for religious landuse controversies is that the permissible limitations analysis explained by
Professor Gunn would also apply to freedom of speech. A freedom of speech
analogy is also relevant to limitations on religious rights for several reasons.
First, both freedom of speech and freedom of religion are First Amendment
rights recognized under the ICCPR.209 Article 18 of the ICCPR, which
identifies the right of religion and allows for permissible limitations, uses
comparable language to Article 19, which identifies freedom of speech and
likewise allows for limitations.210 Thus, freedom of speech joins nicely with a
discussion on cultural sensitivity because the permissible limitations religious
calculus is the same as the one on expression. However, this Comment
analogizes with freedom of speech limitations because there is greater
comparative jurisprudence on freedom of speech controversies. These freedom
of speech limitations provide further traction for and elaboration on cultural
sensitivity as a factor infused into permissible limitations. Second, freedom of
speech is subject to even less regulation than freedom of religion, and thus the
notion that cultural sensitivity may play a role in freedom of speech regulations
means that it is even more likely to influence freedom of religion restrictions.
The First Amendment, in addition to protecting freedom of religion, also
protects freedom of speech.211 In fact, many scholars argue that the freedom of
speech is the strongest protection afforded to any individual right under the
209

ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 18, 19.
Indeed, international regional human rights regimes have also placed limitations on freedom of speech.
For example, the European Court of Human Rights upheld an Austrian Penal Code permitting government
seizure of a film intended to offend Roman Catholics. Otto-Preminger-Inst. v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34,
57–58 (1995).
211 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
210
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U.S. Constitution.212 Freedom of speech serves a more integral role in the
United States than in the rest of the world and in international human rights
instruments. For example, Germany does not tolerate any form of “hate
speech,” especially those related to Nazi symbols or the Holocaust,213 while the
United States is more averse to prohibiting hate speech. Although Article 19 of
the ICCPR recognizes a protection for freedom of speech, similar to Article 18,
there is also a limitation “[f]or the protection of national security or of public
order, or of public health or morals.”214 Article 20 of the same document
requires a restriction on freedom of speech under circumstances that
“constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.”215 When the
U.S. Senate ratified the ICCPR, it did so with a reservation stating: “Article 20
does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States
that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.”216
Although the United States regulates freedom of speech in only a few
instances, First Amendment law contains several categories of speech that are
subject to ban or regulation.217 Additionally, hate speech has been regulated in
specific contexts, including on college campuses.218 These prohibitions on hate
speech provide further traction for a cultural sensitivity argument. The
principles of protection of offensive speech and content neutrality explain why
it is that in the United States “hate speech” receives constitutional protection,
but the idea that speech can harm or inflict intentional emotional distress
212 See generally Robert E. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of
the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377.
213 Id.
214 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 19.
215 Id. art. 20.
216 Sedler, supra note 212, at 379.
217 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793,
793 (1991).
218 For a discussion of hate speech codes on college campuses, see Thomas A. Schweitzer, Hate Speech
on Campus and the First Amendment: Can They Be Reconciled?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 493 (1995); Azhar Majeed,
Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 481, 484 (2009) (“Currently, however, speech codes are commonplace on college campuses, and they
severely restrict the ability of students to participate in, and contribute to, a true marketplace of ideas. Johns
Hopkins University, for instance, maintains a speech code prohibiting all ‘[r]ude, disrespectful behavior.’
Texas A&M University prohibits its students from violating others’ rights to ‘respect for personal feelings’ and
‘freedom from indignity of any type.’ Lewis-Clark State College defines ‘harassment’ to include any speech
that ‘detains, embarrasses, or degrades’ another individual. Ohio State University maintains a housing policy
which instructs students, ‘Do not joke about differences related to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender,
ability, socioeconomic background, etc.’ Rhode Island College states that it ‘will not tolerate actions or
attitudes that threaten the welfare’ of other students.”).
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suggests that there is an infusion of sensitivity in the law. Catharine
MacKinnon, writing about group defamation and pornography, explained
situations that create traumas:
I have come to think, [] that real atrocities provide the vocabulary of
experience that animate the concept of group defamation, and some
of the situations referred to are real to people, and some are not.
Some are seen as threatening as well as offensive; others are regarded
as perhaps insulting but comparatively harmless. The comparatively
more real situations are the Holocaust against the Jews under
Germany’s Third Reich, the genocide of Native Americans, the
slavery and segregation of Blacks in the United States and South
Africa, and the internment and atomic bombing of the Japanese
during World War II. The verbal and visual terms of vilification and
denigration that mark these peak episodes, when reiterated, keep their
219
specific traumas alive . . . .

MacKinnon additionally expressed that pornography was defamation and
discrimination, and, given the link to sexual violence and subordination, these
sensitive images should not survive free speech protections.220 Pornography is
a First Amendment right that the state restricts in certain settings and across
different environments.221 Society keeps pornographic images away from
schools, churches, and synagogues despite a First Amendment right to freedom
of speech and expression. While international instruments seek to regulate the
dissemination of these images more explicitly,222 the United States does
contain certain restrictions on freedom of speech.
Cultural sensitivity has a role in other current lawmaking and controversy.
On January 8, 2011, a gunman shot U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords and
eighteen other people outside a supermarket in Tuscon, Arizona.223 Six of the
victims died.224 In the wake of the Arizona shooting, news surfaced that
members of the Westboro Baptist Church agreed with the motives behind the

219

MacKinnon, supra note 217, at 793.
Id.
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., 1981 Declaration, supra note 73 (“State parties . . . shall declare an offence punishable by
law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.”).
223 Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2011, at A1.
224 Id.
220
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gunfire and planned to protest outside the funerals of the victims.225 Arizona
legislators passed an emergency law that would ban picketing within 300 feet
of the funeral or burial service.226 The Arizona House of Representatives and
Arizona State Senate passed the bill unanimously, and Governor Jan Brewer
signed the legislation.227 Governor Brewer explained that the purpose of the
emergency law was to “assure that the victims of Saturday’s tragic shooting in
Tucson will be laid to rest in peace with the full dignity and respect that they
deserve.”228 Other states have passed similar protest bans.229 This legislation is
a clear cultural sensitivity response and limitation on the First Amendment
right of free speech.
The Westboro Baptist Church recently argued before the Supreme Court
that the First Amendment protected the funeral demonstrations.230 Attorneys
for plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court should prohibit these funeral
protests because “[w]e are talking about a funeral . . . . If context was ever
going to matter, it has to matter for a funeral.”231 On March 2, 2011, the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects protests at military
funerals.232 However, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, also
noted that a proper response to hurtful protests is general laws creating buffer
zones around funerals.233 For example, forty-three states, including Maryland,
where the protest took place, and the federal government, have laws creating
buffer zones, which the Court indicated are legal.234 Therefore, there are still
instances where the state can impose distance regulations for rights that disrupt
public order, highlighted by cultural sensitivity issues.

225 Naimah Jabali-Nash, Westboro Baptist Church Target of New Law Banning Protest at Ariz. Shooting
Victims’ Funerals, CBS NEWS (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20028271504083.html.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.; see also, e.g., Jimmy Myers, House Committee Advances 3 Funeral-Picketing Bills, NEWS-PRESS
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.newspressnow.com/localnews/26881491/detail.html (“The bills seek to protect the
privacy of grieving families from disturbances like those caused by the Westboro protesters. The bill would
also make it a class B misdemeanor to picket one hour before or as much as two hours after a funeral or
memorial service, and within 300 feet of the service.”).
230 Ariane De Vogue, Westboro Baptist Church Comes to the Supreme Court: Are Military Protesters
Protected by the First Amendment?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supreme-courthears-arguments-protests-military-funerals-members/story?id=11812444.
231 Id.
232 Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Protesters at Military Funerals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at A1.
233 Id.
234 Id.

GREENFIELD GALLEYSFINAL2

1352

3/21/2012 8:10 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

It was the protestors’ proximity to the funeral as they exercised their right
of free speech that elicited public feelings of disrespect, discomfort, and
insensitivity regarding the dead. The State of Arizona chose to limit and
regulate the First Amendment rights of the protestors in light of a prevailing
state interest.235 While there might be a constitutional issue with this type of
regulation, the example of funeral regulations sheds light on the role that
cultural sensitivity may have on the law. While a state may mask the
sensitivity with labels such as “public order” or “safety,” it is easy to discern
that there are issues of cultural sensitivity that compel the state to regulate
these rights.
Thus, the above free speech examples illustrate the legal restrictions and
responses that may arise when words and images threaten respect and human
dignity. These examples reveal that limitations infused with cultural sensitivity
involve specific settings or contexts: hate speech, sexual images, and the right
to protest outside of a funeral. Indeed, these limitations on freedom of speech
provide support for cultural sensitivity restrictions on religious liberty.
Additionally, these examples illustrate that cultural sensitivity is an implicit
factor in the limitations analysis and represent difficult proportionality issues.
In the Arizona shooting example above, the governor sought to ban the
protestors under the veil of safety and public order, but it was also a response
to the outrage over the presence of protestors at an event that was intended to
respect the dead.236 In the United States, claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress have restricted free speech;237 this is a sensitivity argument
that goes to safety. In Germany and elsewhere, hate speech and symbols that
cause harm are likewise restricted,238 partially due to a sensitivity argument.
Now, this Comment turns to a religious cultural sensitivity example.
B. Example of Religious Cultural Sensitivity: The Auschwitz Convent Example
While the free speech analogies are invaluable to understanding how
cultural sensitivity is part of the limitations process, an example of cultural
sensitivity and religious land use provides a guide to understanding the
difficult issues surrounding Park51. Many commentators and scholars have
compared the current controversy of Park51 to the Auschwitz convent
controversy. Both incidents highlight the issues surrounding limitations on
235
236
237
238

See Jabali-Nash, supra note 225.
See supra Part IV.A.
Id.
Id.
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religious freedom in the context of land use and cultural sensitivity. This
Subpart will argue that, while the Auschwitz convent provides some parallel
issues, the differences between the Carmelite convent and Park51 undermine a
strong analogy.
In 1984, Carmelite nuns, with approval from Polish authorities and
Catholic Church officials, opened a convent at the site of Auschwitz.239 The
building that housed the nunnery had originally been a theater but was utilized
during World War II to store the poison gas used in the Auschwitz–Birkenau
crematoria.240 The Auschwitz convent intersected with international law in
important ways. There were international meetings in Geneva to resolve the
issue.241 Two top-level meetings in Geneva in 1986 and 1987, attended on the
Catholic side by four cardinals and on the Jewish side by Western European
leaders, led Catholics to create a new “center of information, education,
meeting, and prayer outside the area of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camps.”242
Cardinal Franciszek Macharski, who participated in the meetings, agreed that
the nuns would be transferred to the new site within two years.243 Primary
sources surrounding the incident reveal the hostility and attempts at peace in
the declaration adopted at the 1987 meeting of representatives from the
Catholic Church and Jewish leaders in Geneva.244 The declaration stated that
there will be an establishment of an “information center” open to all faiths, but
that there will be “no permanent Catholic place of worship on the site of the
Auschwitz and Birkenau camps.”245 The declaration’s rationale is particularly
interesting in the context of religious sensitivity: the purpose of the document
was “to ensure respect for the memory of the dead in the places where Nazi
crimes were perpetrated.”246
The convent additionally intersected with international law because it
violated the 1972 United Nations Convention Concerning the Protection of
World Cultural and National Heritage, designed to preserve sites of

239 Carol Rittner & John K. Roth, Introduction: Memory Offended, in MEMORY OFFENDED: THE
AUSCHWITZ CONVENT CONTROVERSY 5 (Carol Rittner & John K. Roth eds., 1991).
240 Auschwitz Convent, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_
0002_0_01611.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See id. For an English translation of the declaration, see The Carmelite Convent at Auschwitz:
Statements February 1987 to December 1989, in MEMORY OFFENDED, supra note 239, at 211.
245 See The Carmelite Convent at Auschwitz, supra note 244, at 211.
246 Id.
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outstanding cultural and national importance.247 Auschwitz, including the
church at Birkenau, was designated as such a site in 1979. As the July 22, 1989
deadline for the removal of the convent approached, tensions continued to rise.
The Board of Deputies of British Jews asked for prayers to be recited in all
synagogues in Britain for the removal of the convent.248 The situation
continued to escalate. American Rabbi Avraham Weiss and six others dressed
in concentration camp clothes protested outside the convent, blew the
shofar,249 and screamed “Nazi antisemites.”250 Polish workmen responded by
pouring paint and water on the protesters and physically removing them from
the former concentration camp.251 Later, 300 European Jewish students
protested to the sound of the shofar.252 Cardinal Macharski then announced
both that the Geneva agreement was canceled and that the nuns would remain
at the Auschwitz site.253 The nuns refused to leave the building, and departed
only in the summer of 1993 following a letter from the Pope and pressure from
the Polish Bishops’ Conference.254
For Jewish people, the Carmelite convent and tall cross in the garden,
although well intentioned, had been “wrong-minded, insensitive, and an
intrusive offense.”255 Although the Carmelite nuns were not responsible for the
Holocaust, the limitation of their religious land use on the site of Auschwitz
stemmed from a brand of “cultural sensitivity” that involved a “respect for the
dead” and desire to quell hostility for public order in Poland. Further, it did not
matter that some of the Holocaust victims included members of the Catholic
Church, the very group that experienced limitations on their religious freedom
to build a convent on Auschwitz.256

247 See Avi Weiss, The Future of Auschwitz: Raising a Voice of Moral Conscience Against the
Christianization of Auschwitz-Birkenau, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 672 (1998).
248 Auschwitz Convent, supra note 240.
249 “[T]he shofar is featured most prominently in the Rosh Hashanah morning services. It is considered a
commandment to hear the shofar blown.” Shofar, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.
org/jsource/Judaism/shofar.html. (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
250 Auschwitz Convent, supra note 240.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. Further, the 1987 Geneva Agreement and the 1972 UN Convention are violated not only by the
Birkenau church, but also by the twenty-four-foot cross still standing alongside the old convent building at
Auschwitz. See Weiss, supra note 247, at 672.
255 See Rittner & Roth, supra note 239, at 5.
256 Id.
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Here, the common issue of permissible limitations on freedom with respect
to land use in certain settings or circumstances (cultural sensitivity) is clear.
The Auschwitz convent controversy is a compelling example of high-pressure
diplomacy leading to the abandonment of a religious building that inflamed the
public. The controversy can be tied more directly to the formal limitations on
religious freedom recognized in the ICCPR and other international human
rights instruments, as well as the Siracusa Principles that elaborated on the
ICCPR. As discussed earlier, the ICCPR provides that “[e]veryone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.”257 The ICCPR also
contains language that identifies the circumstances under which the state may
properly restrict the right:258 “when necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”259 The
proportionality and necessity must be weighed to determine if one of the
categories of limitation will allow any regulation.260 Here, there is little doubt
that the placement of the Auschwitz convent engendered feelings of outrage,
highlighted by cultural sensitivity. The convent was housed on the actual site
of the concentration camp and in the actual building that stored the gas used in
the genocide. Although there was diplomatic intervention before any state
action, it is plausible that the convent could have been weighed as an issue of
public order or public safety, especially considering the subsequent protests
and clashes.261
The next Part addresses the Park51 controversy and a comparison to
cultural sensitivity conflicts.
V. THE PARK51 MOSQUE
The above discussion has traced the limitations analysis on religious
freedom through an international human rights framework,262 explained the
relationship between the international norms and U.S. domestic law,263 and
addressed the key “cultural sensitivity” arguments surrounding the Park51
mosque.264 This Part applies that detailed examination to Park51. While the
257

ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.
Gunn, Permissible Scope, supra note 10, at xi.
259 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.
260 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 254.
261 See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR allows restrictions in the name of public
safety and order. Id.
262 See supra Part II.
263 See supra Part III.
264 See supra Part IV.
258
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mosque will be constructed in New York, Park51 has both attracted the
international eye and triggered issues of international human rights. Although
the United States has enforced these religious rights and boundaries of
permissible limitations through land-use statutes such as RLUIPA,265
international law provides a helpful lens through which to refine, understand,
and expand the treatment of religious conflicts in the United States.266
The issue of the legal scope of Park51 is whether the state may properly
limit the right of a Muslim community to build a worship center near Ground
Zero. The permissible limitations on religious exercise go to the heart of the
Park51 mosque. Park51 may not be restricted under an international human
rights framework, especially in light of the antidiscrimination mandates that
prevent the state from targeting a specific religious group, such as the Muslim
population.267 Importantly, because the mosque is in New York, the United
States may not place limitations on Park51 because of RLUIPA, which reflects
the mandates of the ICCPR and other international human rights
instruments.268 The United States, however, should use international human
rights to maintain a strict scrutiny regime as construction on the mosque begins
this year. Further, the delicate nature of Park51, a phenomenon this Comment
has termed “cultural sensitivity,” is a factor diffused into the broad categories
of public interest, such as public order or morals, and proportionality.269 While
it is clear that the mosque engenders the cultural sensitivity that is an implicit
part of the limitations analysis, the cultural sensitivity aimed at the Park51
mosque does not rise to the level that justifies a permissible limitation.270
Thus, the short answer is that state restriction against Park51 is
impermissible, but that answer is riddled with complexities that shed light into
the general grounds for permissible limitations of religious expression.
A. Permissible Limitations on Park51
International human rights norms, as outlined earlier,271 are helpful for a
review of the permissible limitations on religious expression.272 International
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272

See supra Part III.A.
WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 44, at 270.
See supra Parts II.C, III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.B.
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norms are also important to ensure that the United States maintains a high
barrier to limitations and regulations on religious liberties, especially in light of
widespread discrimination against Muslim communities.273 The United States
should look to these international standards in evaluating religious liberty
controversies such as Park51 to prevent discrimination and to ensure that the
law sets a high bar for any government action that would impose restrictions
on religious liberty.
1. Right To Build a Worship Center
A limitations analysis for religious liberties, such as the right to build
Park51, is necessary only if there is a protected right. Prior to an analysis of
permissible limitations on Park51, it is necessary to establish that the right to
build and maintain a mosque as a religious house of worship is a protected
religious liberty.274 The first step in the process involves identifying the right.
The second step asks whether the state may permissibly restrict or regulate that
right.275
Under international law, the proposed construction of Park51 is part of a
protected right under freedom of religion: the right to build a religious worship
center.276 International human rights instruments explicitly identify the right to
build and maintain a place of worship as a religious right.277 As discussed in
Part II, for example, the 1981 Declaration provides enumerated categories of
religious activities protected under “freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion,” including the right “to worship or assemble in connection with a
religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes.”278
Further, the reports of the Special Rapporteur to the United Nations, and the
273 See, e.g., Robbie Brown, Arson Cases at Mosque in Tennessee Spreads Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2010, at A10 (“After a suspected arson and reports of gunshots at an Islamic center in Tennessee over the
weekend, nearby mosques have hired security guards, installed surveillance cameras and requested the
presence of federal agents at prayer services.”); Steven Greenhouse, Offended Muslims Speak Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2010, at B1 (“At a time of growing tensions involving Muslims in the United States, a record number
of Muslim workers are complaining of employment discrimination, from co-workers calling them ‘terrorist’ or
‘Osama’ to employers barring them from wearing head scarves or taking prayer breaks.”).
274 See supra Part II.A.
275 Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 254–56; Gunn, Permissible Scope, supra note 10, at
x.
276 See supra Part II.A.
277 International human rights instruments often provide a direct right to build a religious worship center.
The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document is an international instrument that also contains the basic religious
rights provisions relevant for the Park51 analysis: the “right of religious communities to establish and maintain
freely accessible places of worship or assembly.” Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 75, princ. 16.
278 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 6.
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U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports all identify
religious worship centers as a religious right.279 For example, one report by the
Special Rapporteur identified the limitation on the right to build a mosque as a
violation of freedom of religion when the Muslim religious minority in
Slovenia faced illegal restrictions on its right to build a mosque.280 Thus, the
right to build a place of worship is clearly recognized as part of freedom of
religion under international law.
There is no doubt that Park51 is a place of worship. A community of
“downtown Muslim Americans,” a religious minority in the United States, has
come together to build Park51 as a “sanctuary that celebrates the best qualities
of [the Muslim] faith.”281 Park51 will clearly be a worship center because the
proposal includes a prayer space that will accommodate approximately 2,000
people and “will offer a range of services and religious programming,
including Qur’an classes, Qur’anic recitation [tajwid], Islamic sciences,
Arabic, and others.”282 Additionally, the prayer space will be open for daily
prayers.283 Thus Park51, in its capacity as a worship center, falls within the
boundaries of protected religious liberties. The next discussion addresses the
permissible limitations on the Park51 mosque.
2. The Park51 Mosque and the ICCPR
Using the international framework discussed in Part II,284 it is clear that
limitations on the construction of Park51 would violate international human
rights law. First, and most importantly because the United States ratified the
ICCPR,285 limitations on the construction of Park51 are illegal under the
ICCPR. As previously stated, the ICCPR provides for the circumstances under
which a state may restrict a religious activity,286 such as in the case of the
Park51 controversy. Essentially, Park51 may be restricted when the limitations
are necessary to protect public safety, public order, health, morals, or the
fundamental rights of others,287 but there is also a proportionality requirement

279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

See supra Part II.A.
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, supra note 79.
Our Story, PARK51 COMMUNITY CENTER, http://park51.org/our-story/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
About, PRAYERSPACE, http://www.prayerspacenyc.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
BEDERMAN, supra note 64, at 101.
See supra Part II.B.3; ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 18.
Van der Vyver, supra note 92, at 511.
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that ensures a high threshold to such restrictions on the mosque.288 Any
permissible limitation to protect public safety or order, health, or morals or
fundamental rights of others must also be proportional to the limitation
imposed on the religious group,289 in this case, the Muslim community of
Park51.
Thus, if New York seeks to limit or regulate the construction of Park51, it
must first identify the permissible interest served by restricting the construction
of the mosque. Secondly, any restriction on Park51 must fulfill the
proportionality and necessity requirements outlined by the Siracusa
Principles.290 The public interest fulfilled by regulating Park51 must be at least
equal to the usurped right of the New York Muslim community to build and
maintain a house of worship. The potential restriction of Park51 is, of course,
one of the tougher proportionality issues outlined by Professor Gunn, and is
similar to his example of a Hindu religious celebration on the site where Hindu
nationalists had previously burned a mosque.291 The sponsors of Park51 plan to
begin construction on private property, in a space that formerly served as a
retail store, the Burlington Coat Factory.292 The proposed construction does not
conflict with zoning regulations and neighborhood codes that serve to uphold
broad interests of public order, nor does it violate any historic preservation
guidelines.293 In fact, a community board and the National Preservation
Society support the colossal demolition and construction project that will
ultimately culminate in Park51.294 Given that the mosque has already survived
codes and regulations that help maintain public order and safety, it is difficult
to imagine the proportionality analysis weighing in favor of a permissible
limitation.
As construction begins on the Park51 mosque, however, additional codes
will follow with respect to building ordinances. It is imperative that Park51
prevail against any religious discrimination masked as a regulation. One
commentator noted that “[o]pponents of new mosque construction often cite
factors other than religion, like parking and traffic, when houses of worship
288

Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 261–62.
Van der Vyver, supra note 92, at 511–12; Gunn, Permissible Limitations, supra note 72, at 262.
290 Siracusa Principles, supra note 108.
291 See supra Part IV.A.1.
292 See supra Part I.A. It is relevant that the proposed mosque is on private property because secular
private religious expression and speech enjoy a greater protection than displays in a public forum or property.
See, e.g., Capitol Sq. Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
293 See supra Part I.A.
294 See id.; Salazar, supra note 1.
289
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expand . . . [b]ut religion often remains part of the mix.”295 For example,
William Rench, a pastor of a Calvary Baptist Church in Temecula, California,
cited land-use issues in a statement on a mosque protest in California.296 He
said his “primary concern” was that the “property is wholly inadequate and
unsuited for the proposed 25,000-square-foot Islamic worship center.”297
While land-use concerns are valid issues of public order, Rench infused
religious discrimination with his land-use arguments: “It seems logical to me
that we would be opposed to Islam based on its fundamental teachings and on
documented stories of the terror that radical Islam promotes.”298 A limitation
rooted in religious discrimination is illegal under the ICCPR, and as further
issues arise surrounding the construction of Park51, the state would be wise to
view facially neutral regulations with skepticism.
Indeed, the grounds for excluding the mosque appear to stem from both its
proximity to the location of Ground Zero and its function as a house of
worship for the Muslim community.299 The ICCPR explicitly forbids state
limitations aimed at only one group of individuals.300 It is highly doubtful that
there would be such controversy if Park51 were a church or a synagogue.
Additionally, while the ICCPR allows for restriction of religion in times of
national security or “public emergency,” such as terrorism threats, the
measures taken cannot discriminate against only the Muslim community.301
Thus, the state cannot restrict Park51 merely because a group of radical
Muslim terrorists were responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center
in 2001, especially because the sponsors of Park51 are not connected with al
Qaeda.
3. The Park51 Mosque and Subsequent Human Rights Instruments
While the above discussion reveals that the ICCPR clearly prohibits a
restriction of Park51, the support for the mosque does not stop there. Later
human rights instruments further support the continued construction of Park51
and shield the mosque from impermissible state limitations.302 The
295

Schwartz, supra note 31.
Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See supra Part I.A.
300 See supra Part II.B.2.
301 Van der Vyver, supra note 92, at 513 (“Emergency regulations applicable to, for example, only the
Muslim community would, therefore, violate the norm enunciated in this provision [of the ICCPR].”).
302 See supra Part II.B.3.
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international human rights instruments following the ICCPR also mandate that
states actively prevent discrimination; mere omission is not sufficient. The
1981 Declaration is relevant to the Park51 mosque because it recognizes a
right “to establish and maintain places” for worship; this is a specifically
enumerated guarantee that shields Park51 as a matter of international human
rights law.303 While the 1981 Declaration also allows states to impose
limitations in the interest of factors such as health, safety, or public order, the
more elaborate antidiscrimination clauses would prohibit any restriction on the
Park51 mosque.304 The 1981 Declaration would mandate that the United States
not only refrain from “any distinction, exclusion, [or] restriction” of the
Muslim community’s right to build Park51, but also affirmatively “take
effective measures” to prevent discrimination that might interfere with the
construction of the mosque.305 Although the Park51 mosque has a long road
ahead, New York’s approval of preliminary barriers, such as zoning laws,
building codes, and historical preservation regulations are in line with the 1981
Declaration.306
Park51 has survived some of the initial state barriers and restrictions, but it
is imperative that the state embrace and utilize “measures” to prevent future
obstacles and discrimination as construction begins on the mosque. The reach
of the 1981 Declaration should not be underestimated. The 1981 Declaration
mandates that these measures effectively prevent potential barriers aimed at
subverting the proposed mosque “in all fields of civil, economic, political,
social and cultural life.”307 These antidiscrimination mandates apply to
discrimination by “any State, institution, group of persons, or person on
grounds of religion or other beliefs.”308 This is an incredibly broad protection.
For example, Park51 has applied for a federal grant called the Lower
Manhattan Development Corporation (“LMDC”) for “community or cultural
facilities.”309 The text of the 1981 Declaration arguably covers discriminatory
treatment in government grants because it covers fields of civil, economic, and
cultural life.310 Clearly the federal government would qualify as a “[s]tate,
303

See supra Part II.B.3; 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 6.
See supra Part II.B.3.
305 See supra Part II.B.3.
306 See supra Part II.B.3.
307 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 4.1.
308 Id. art. 2.
309 Katrina Trinko, Park51 Asks for Federal Funding, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 23, 2010, 2:52 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/253836/park51-asks-federal-funding-katrina-trinko.
310 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 4.1.
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institution, group of persons, or person.”311 Because LMDC was founded to
revitalize the community after the attacks on the World Trade Center, Park51’s
application for federal funding has been controversial.312 However, Park51 will
have a “community center, which will include a gym, a pool, a day care center,
a pre-K, a culinary institute, tech classes, an amphitheater, and a 9/11
Memorial.”313 Despite sensitivity issues, the community center is within the
zone of eligibility for the grant and should receive fair consideration, unless no
religious entity is eligible for the grant. At the time of this writing, the
decisions on the grant have not been completed, but the 1981 Declaration
would prohibit any discrimination with respect to Park51’s application because
the sponsors are part of the Muslim community, especially given the grant’s
“cultural” purpose.314 While the LMDC grant is not a state limitation per se, it
is relevant to the idea that unfairly denying the approval of regulations and
building codes for Park51 is similarly an impermissible limitation under the
1981 Declaration. It is also relevant because the 1981 Declaration instructs
states to take affirmative measures to combat intolerance315—even with respect
to government decisions that might unfairly consider an application for federal
money.
The last two international agreements discussed in conjunction with the
international framework are the Vienna Concluding Document and the 1992
Minorities Declaration.316 These two sets of international human rights norms
crystallize the above discussion of Park51 under the ICCPR and the 1981
Declaration. The Vienna Concluding Document also includes religious rights
that directly protect the right of religious communities to assemble and build a
place of worship.317 The Vienna Concluding Document echoes all of the
requirements of the 1981 Declaration and similarly carves out a right to build
and maintain a house of worship, such as the mosque within Park51.318
Accordingly, the Vienna Concluding Document lends further support to the
analysis of Park51 under the 1981 Declaration. Lastly, the 1992 Minorities
Declaration refines the international framework by addressing the issue of self-

311

See id. at art. 2.
Trinko, supra note 309.
313 Park51 LMDC Funding Request, PARK51 COMMUNITY CENTER, http://park51.org/2010/11/park51lmdc-funding-request/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
314 See id.
315 1981 Declaration, supra note 73, art. 4.
316 See supra Part II.B.3.
317 See supra Part II.B.3.
318 See supra Part II.B.3.
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determination.319 A religious community, such as the Muslim community of
Park51, should be able to practice its religion without limitations imposed by
the state.320 The 1992 Minorities Declaration is particularly relevant because
the Muslim community is a marginalized, minority religion within the United
States.
4. International Law and U.S. Domestic Law
Additionally, U.S. domestic law embraces international human rights
norms through RLUIPA, which parallels the proportionality and necessity
requirements of the ICCPR.321 As discussed above, RLUIPA has become a
substitute for the strict scrutiny regime, which was replaced by an insufficient
heightened rational review after the Smith decision in 1990.322 Yet, there are
still concerns about widespread religious discrimination in the United States,
such as masking prejudice under the guise of zoning laws or traffic safety
codes.323 In reference to the high bar set by RLUIPA for any government
restriction on a religious institution, one commentator noted that “[d]espite the
clear advantage that [RLUIPA] gives to religious institutions, disputes over the
construction of mosques have emerged around the country.”324 For this reason,
it is imperative that the United States fully embrace a strict scrutiny regime
contemplated by the proportionality and necessity requirements in the ICCPR,
the Siracusa Principles, and related international human rights documents
when dealing with potential regulations of Park51.
Potential restrictions on Park51 appear to be aimed at the fact that this
particular house of worship is a mosque located two blocks from the location
of the World Trade Center site. However, as contemplated by ICCPR and the
subsequent human rights instruments, a limitation that prevents the sponsors of
Park51 from going forward with construction would be discriminatory. This is
the type of limitation that is expressly prohibited. Amidst apparent
discrimination of mosques all over the country,325 Park51 has survived zoning
laws. As discussed above, a community board passed a resolution in favor of
the project326 and the Park51 sponsors have received approval to demolish the
319
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321
322
323
324
325
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building to clear the space for the construction of Park51.327 When asked about
his opinion on the Park51 center, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
said that “[w]e in New York are Jews and Christians and Muslims . . . each
with an equal right to worship and pray where we choose,” and that “[t]here is
nowhere in the five boroughs that is off limits to any religion.”328 International
human rights instruments would commend these decisions. As the Park51
construction begins and the issue evolves, it is necessary that the state maintain
this view despite potential backlash and protest, and especially amidst facially
neutral laws that are beyond RLUIPA’s scope.
B. Cultural Sensitivity and Park51
As discussed above, this Comment has addressed a cultural sensitivity
argument in part because politicians and commentators described this
controversy as a “sensitivity” issue.329 Cultural sensitivity is often overlooked
as a mere emotional argument as opposed to being viewed as a relevant legal
factor. Indeed, cultural sensitivity both needs to be and is part of the limitations
analysis, as also reflected in First Amendment jurisprudence. This type of
cultural sensitivity is often embedded within broad categories of public interest
and public order and is part of the international legal framework for religious
limitations.330 Ultimately, while cultural sensitivity is helpful in determining
permissible limitations on religious expression, it is not dispositive in the case
of Park51.
The Carmelite convent controversy is a striking example of pervasive
cultural sensitivity that resulted in international, high-pressure diplomacy to
remove the convent.331 Similarities between the proposed location of the
Park51 mosque and the location of the convent have led commentators to call
for the removal of the mosque.332 Indeed, both the convent and the mosque
involve religious land use on or near the site where a horrific tragedy caused
mass death.333 The link between the historical example of the Auschwitz
controversy and the current Park51 controversy reveals the infusion of cultural
sensitivity in religious land use. Cultural sensitivity factors into broad
327
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categories that justify government limitations and is a force in the law that
deserves attention, especially when the key opposition to religious right
involves a “sensitivity” argument.334 However, there are also important
differences between Park51 and the Carmelite convent. These distinctions
ultimately account for the reasons why a cultural sensitivity argument can
prevail under the Auschwitz controversy but fail under the current mosque
construction in New York.
First, there is a difference between the locations of the religious buildings
in relation to the sensitive site. In the convent controversy, the building the
nuns used was actually part of the Auschwitz concentration camp and utilized
for storage of poisonous gas.335 By contrast, the proposed construction of
Park51 is located two blocks from the location of Ground Zero, on private
property in a building formerly occupied by the Burlington Coat Factory, and
within “a highly congested urban neighborhood where its presence will be
barely noticeable.”336 In the Auschwitz example, the Jewish community was
outraged because the convent was located on the actual grounds of the
concentration camp. Yet Park51 will not be on the site of Ground Zero.
A mosque, however, could likewise detract from the memory of the dead
and the message of the World Trade Center site. Ground Zero is also “a sacred
place . . . a mass grave, the site of a terrible atrocity.”337 One writer notes that
“even those who favor this new Islamic Center surely can appreciate why some
American feelings are rubbed raw by the idea of a mosque at a place where
Islamic terrorists killed more than 2,700 innocent people.”338 However, after
the Pope, pursuant to the Geneva meetings, removed the convent to only 600
yards away from Auschwitz, the Jewish community accepted that move;339 600
yards away from the concentration camp is a similar distance to two blocks
away from Ground Zero. The issue for the Jewish community was that the
convent was located on the actual concentration camp.340 In the case of Park51,
the founders never intended for the mosque to be on the Ground Zero site.
334
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While two and a half blocks is still an uncomfortable distance, the physical
location weighs against a cultural sensitivity application to the Park51 mosque.
Further, there have been cases in other countries where the location has
been more severe, but the plans have been allowed to proceed. For example,
the Simon Wiesenthal Center has been accused of intolerance itself for
building its Jerusalem Museum of Tolerance on land that was once a Muslim
cemetery.341 The Wiesenthal Center’s right to build there has been upheld in
Israeli courts.342 The Wiesenthal Center announced its plan for a large museum
in 2004, prompting Palestinians to take the issue to the Israeli high court. In
October 2008, the court ruled that the project could proceed. There are
currently petitions to the UN Security Council on the issue.343
Second, the ideology behind the placement of the convent at Auschwitz and
the planned location of the Park51 mosque diverge in important ways. The
Carmelite nunnery was solely a Catholic institution, which included none of
the interfaith aspects and community activities planned for the mosque. In fact,
part of the agreement reached at Geneva concerning the Auschwitz
controversy resulted in a new “center of information, education, meeting, and
prayer outside the area of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camps.”344 Thus, the
international agreement resulted in a building that resonates with some of the
proposed purposes behind the Park51 project. Additionally, the founders of the
Carmelite convent explained that the convent would serve as “a spiritual
fortress and a guarantee of the conversion of strayed brothers from our
countries as well as proof of our desire to erase outrages so often done to the
Vicar of Christ.”345 The papacy that failed to condemn Nazi Germany and the
genocide at Auschwitz is the same papacy that exercised control over the
Carmelite convent.346 There is no similar or institutional connection between
the sponsors of the Park51 mosque and the al Qaeda terrorists responsible for
the attacks on the World Trade Center.

341 Adam Dickter, Wiesenthal Center Opposes Ground Zero Mosque, JEWISH WK. (Aug. 6, 2010),
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The relatively short lapse of time between the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the proposed construction of the Park51 mosque also
involves cultural sensitivity. When the Catholic Church authorized the
Carmelite nunnery, it was nearly forty years after the Holocaust.347 The attacks
of September 11, 2001, were only ten years ago and the memory is still
painfully fresh in the minds of many Americans who live in New York and
around the world. One commentator noted, “[i]f feelings in Auschwitz were
raw after nearly half a century, it’s not hard to see why they would remain raw
at Ground Zero after less than a decade.”348
It is difficult to reconcile the severity of the Auschwitz convent with the
location of Park51. However, the sensitivity might be equally strong for many
Americans. While the Pope ultimately removed the convent under diplomatic
pressure, the convent faced similar issues involving public order, protests, and
potential regulation by Poland. The example illustrates how sensitivity is an
implicit consideration in whether a religious act might threaten public order
and public safety, such that a government can justify a restriction on such an
act.349 However, in the case of Park51, the sensitivity is present, but does not
rise to the level that justifies government restriction based on the limitations
analysis.
CONCLUSION
The thrust of this Comment is a review of religious land-use issues through
an international framework that includes cultural sensitivity. This Comment
presents an international framework on permissible limitations on religious
freedom, applies this discussion to U.S. domestic law, and argues that cultural
sensitivity is part of the limitations analysis. In this regard, this review argues
two unique angles: (1) that the United States should look to international
human rights norms, which some domestic land-use statutes already embody,
when dealing with questions of religious rights and limitations; and (2) that the
cultural sensitivity arguments have not been considered fully as part of a legal
framework, and this brand of sensitivity is indeed a factor in the limitations
analysis under international human rights law. Part V of this Comment applies
this methodology to the current controversy surrounding the construction of
the Park51 mosque near Ground Zero. Given the inflamed passions that arose
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both in support and opposition when news of Park51 became public,350 this
particular mosque controversy became the perfect test case for the international
law and cultural sensitivity framework outlined in Parts II–IV.
The result of this analysis is that state limitations of the Park51 mosque are
illegal under international human rights law.351 After presenting background
information on the controversy, this Comment proceeds through four dominant
sections that articulate how international human rights law is important in this
controversy and why a restriction on Park51 is illegal. First, the international
framework section reveals that the ICCPR and subsequent human rights
documents allow for limitations to protect broad interests such as public order.
The proportionality requirement, however, weighs against restricting Park51.
Indeed, Park51 has already survived some of the initial barriers, such as zoning
laws and building codes,352 which serve public order. Even for the purpose of a
national emergency or national security, as some commentators have argued in
relation to Park51, the state cannot restrict or discriminate against only one
religious institution, such as the Muslim community.353
Second, this Comment explains that the ICCPR and related international
instruments also provide guidance and elaboration into RLUIPA’s strict
scrutiny standard. As discussed earlier, RLUIPA is a step in the right direction
toward these international norms, especially after the Smith decision lowered
the threshold from a strict scrutiny regime to a type of heightened rational
review.354 Yet, RLUIPA itself contains some gaps because the state can use
facially neutral statutes in a discriminatory way. Thus, any zoning or traffic
concerns should be viewed with skepticism. The ICCPR and the subsequent
documents would align the United States more fully with international human
rights norms.
Third, a type of sensitivity argument, which this Comment labels as
cultural sensitivity,355 has dominated the discussion surrounding the
construction of Park51. This Comment argues that cultural sensitivity is part of
the international framework on religious limitations, explains how it is used in
the realm of free speech by way of analogy, and compares Park51 to the
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Auschwitz Convent controversy.356 This Comment concludes that the Park51
mosque’s level of cultural sensitivity is not at a sufficient threshold to
influence the factors of public order and proportionality that drive the
limitations analysis.357 However, the idea of cultural sensitivity, although not
sufficient for Park51, does not end here. Cultural sensitivity is part of the
limitations analysis, and while not dispositive, it is helpful in dealing with
religious expression issues.358
Fourth, in Part V, the application of the framework reveals that the state
cannot restrict Park51. As construction begins, there will be more codes,
zoning regulations, and issues that arise. The initial barriers to construction of
Park51 were just the tip of the iceberg, and the United States would be wise to
look to these international human rights norms as significant issues as potential
clashes ebb and flow throughout the long-term construction of this mosque. As
it stands now, potential state limitations on the Park51 center are
impermissible.
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